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Underground Gardens and Homes 
In 1980, three years before Ronald Reagan launched the Strategic Defensive Initiative 
(aka Star Wars), Jay Swayze, a former military operative turned builder published a 
book entitled Underground Gardens and Homes: The Best of Two Worlds – Above and 
Below. As the title suggests the publication set out the case for a new type of 
architectural domesticity, beneath the ground. Its basic premise – outlined in what 
the author termed the principles of Geo-building – is that underground living 
provides security from the actions of both man and nature. Swayze’s publication 
took the form of a catalogue, a kind of apocalyptic pattern book where prospective 
troglodytes could choose from a range of typologies with special features. Find a site 
and define a type and Swayze would come and dig a hole for you, line it with 
reinforced concrete and insert a domestic unit like, as the author describes, ‘a ship in 
a bottle’.1 
Whatever the implications of an underground interior, it is the notional 
outside spaces that appear the most problematic. The ‘back yard, front yard, patio, 
courtyard, garden or swimming pool’, Swayze iterates, all remain within the shell, 
all comfortably underground.2 [1] The solution is obvious, total environmental and 
visual control. Both outside and inside spaces are illuminated through a combination 
of artificial lighting and fibre optic cables that convey sunlight from the surface. 
Following Swayze’s assertions on the redundancy of conventional windows, views 
are conveyed via dial-up dioramas – painted canvases on rollers that can be changed 
according to mood. Located on the shell wall and visible from either (ersatz) 
window openings within the domestic unit or else from the ‘outside’ spaces, these 
illustrations absolve the underground house from all temporal constraints. It can be 
winter on the patio, spring in the yard, midnight in the bathroom and mid-afternoon 
in the kitchen, simultaneously. Architecturally, the house also evokes little of its 
underground condition. Popular vernacular forms associated with built conventions 
and climatic conditions on the surface – Texan Ranch houses, regency porches, 
	
verandas, arcades, trellised arches, and hints of pitched roofs – are re-assembled to 
furnish what Swayze terms the Underground Dream-world.3 
Despite mentioning the growing scarcity of resources that preoccupies our 
present awareness of the environment, the Underground Gardens and Homes’ origins 
lay in the threat of a nuclear holocaust generally, and the Cuban missile crisis in 
particular. Its prototype, called the Atomitat (Atomic Habitat), emerged in 1962 and, 
according to Swayze, was the first underground house in the US to meet civic 
defence specifications. A further prototype was exhibited in the World’s Fair in New 
York in 1964 where, again according to Swayze, over 1.6 million visitors queued to 
experience first-hand the idea of descending into the surface of the earth in order to 
live. [2)] But, as illustrated in the infamous West German government pamphlet Jeder 
hat eine Chance [Everyone has a Chance] (1961), or in the Underground Space Center 
(in the University of Minnesota), Swayze’s underground dream-world, was just one 
of endless schemes for subterranean survival that proliferated throughout the Cold 
War.4 
 
Becoming atomic: infinite preparation 
This essay draws upon recent research that reads the atomic back into histories of 
post-war architecture and urbanism, to position the bunker at a series of intersections 
and paradoxes of long duration.  Finding a domestic iteration in the Second World 
War, the bunker became an icon of the Cold War whose antecedents in turn continue 
to haunt contemporary space. Embodying the tenets of modernism, the bunker is 
ultimately the antithesis of its bent for utopian, communal progress and instead 
represents a dark mirror – offering a dystopia of fragmentary isolationist, survivalist 
entities, linked through invisible electronic networks designed to withstand 
Armageddon. A space where form strictly follows function – most particularly and 
evocatively the yield of a nuclear bomb – it is simultaneously dense with meaning. 
The pervasiveness of the bunker is not limited to the globalised repetition of its 
physical characteristics and form. The anthropologist Joseph Masco has described the 
incremental inscription of a bunker mentality on the American psyche from the Cold 
War onwards: ‘the elevation of the bunker into an icon of state power and social 
responsibility played a critical role in psychologically preparing and orienting 
Americans for escalating militarism’.5 The bunker, so central to the Cold War 
imagination, continues to provide residues in present day conceptions of threat and 
fear.  
             Given its scale of production and endless iterations, as well as its 
development in the pivotal moments of the Second World War, it can be argued that 
the bunker is as emblematic an architectural space of modernity as the department 
store, the great exhibition, the skyscraper or the machine-inspired domestic 
environments advocated by Le Corbusier and others. It offers a concentrated site in 
which to map how narratives and imaginaries on the city were challenged and 
remade and speculate upon the legacies that the traumas of the Cold War had upon 
urban life. In making this proposition we expand Paul Virilio’s observation that, once 
	
physically eclipsed in its original topographical and technical settings, the socio-
spatial logic of the bunker would mutate into other domains, retaining and remaking 
their meaning in other forms and practices. ‘The essence of the new fortress’ he wrote 
‘… is elsewhere, underfoot, invisible from here on in’.6 To address these speculations, 
we drawn upon David Leatherbarrow’s contention that research in urbanism must 
depart from a reading of the sovereignty of buildings, and attend to their wider 
contexts, relationships and performances.7 To amplify these interpretive tools, the 
essay inspects the imaginations, politics and practices created around the bunker. We 
do this in order to query the relationships these urban imaginaries had to circuits of 
power and knowledge, as well as their interface with the city and modernism. We 
argue also that to give the bunker a place in modernism is to open up a wound in the 
liberal and progressive histories of urbanism which arguably – until challenged by 
the likes of Galison (2001), Farish (2010), Light (2004), Monteyne (2011), McEnaney 
(2000) Rose (2001), Bosma (2012) etc. – diluted or obscured the centrality of war in the 
foundations of urban life.8 Of central significance is the concept, expressed by Michel 
Foucault amongst others, that Western democracies are founded on the 
appropriation and control of violence. For Foucault, ‘Humanity … does not 
gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives where the rule of law 
replaces warfare’ but instead ‘… installs each of its violences in a system of rules, and 
thus proceeds from domination to domination’.9 In this view, war is not an anomaly, 
the opposite of civilization, but rather it lies at its very origins and continuation. 
Walter Benjamin’s famous dictum that ‘There is no document of civilization which is 
not at the same time a document of barbarism’ can, then, be used to map a history of 
architectural modernism. For Paul Virilio and Sylvère Lotringer, the total war 
machine built around the project of deterrence during the Cold War enveloped the 
whole basis and logic of city life. This is what they called the perpetuation of ‘Pure 
War, war which is acted out ... in infinite preparation’.10 
            As the bunker migrates from the military to the domestic sphere during the 
Second World War and subsequently the Cold War – transforming from ‘bomb 
shelter’ to ‘fall-out shelter’ in the process – the ways in which the social contract is 
stressed become more precisely identified. Just as Siegfried Kracauer proposed how 
that other quintessential modern space the hotel lobby is an inverted image of the 
‘house of god’ (the church, the temple, etc.), the bunker shift notions of dissolution 
even further.11 If, as Kracauer, noted the house of god provided a community, a 
directed life, the bunker in spite of the attempts to build it in the spirit of patriotic 
defence, provided to many in the end the opposite, a space of dread, characterized by 
‘extreme anomie’, an endless endgame. 
              The history of the bunker, its networks and infrastructures offers a systemic 
set of insights into the history of the city, or more specifically histories of urbanism. 
‘Becoming atomic’, the intersection of the atomic bomb and the city disrupted the 
progressive trajectory of modernist urbanism whose core rationale envisioned a 
future characterized by improvement and innovation. In this context the debate 
about the bunker became a debate about the relationship between State and 
	
population, and their obligations to one another. These merged into what Farish 
describes as ‘anxious urbanism’.12 Arguments about the resilience or futility of the 
bunker, its logic, its utility and so on was contested, diverse and contradictory. The 
site could variously be a patriotic one, a site where the fallacy of grander nuclear 
policy was revealed, a site of anxiety and fear, a site of resistance, or of invention and 
ingenuity. In becoming atomic, these debates on the bomb blended with debates 
about the city, and inevitably changed the context in which urbanism was conceived. 
 
Killing cities 
An examination of the extraordinary visions of urban atomic obliteration reveals the 
ways in which aerial bombardment came to form the spatial, planning and design 
response to the collapse of Enlightenment – the conflation of war and urbanism, the 
intrusion of military planning within the urban planning. But all these narratives 
represent a similar realisation, the end of a recognisable urban condition. Jacob Viner, 
one of the founders of the Chicago School of Economics, captured the immediate 
understanding of the bomb’s consequences for the city: 
A single atomic bomb can reduce a city and its population to dust … The bomb has a 
minimum size and in this size it is, and will remain, too expensive – or too scarce, 
whether expensive or not – to be used against minor targets. Its targets, therefore, 
must be primarily cities, and its military effectiveness must reside primarily in its 
capacity to destroy urban population and productive facilities. Under atomic bomb 
warfare, the soldier in the army would be safer than his wife and children in their 
urban home.13 
Albert Einstein observed that ‘… should one rocket with atomic warhead strike 
Minneapolis, that city would look exactly like Nagasaki. Rifle bullets kill men, but 
atomic bombs kill cities’.14 In the same year, Lewis Mumford saw atomic weapons as 
a form of madness. He said:  
Truly, those are infernal machines that our elected and appointed madmen are setting. 
When the machines go off, the cities will explode, one after another, like a string of 
firecrackers, burning and blasting every vestige of life to a crisp.15 
These realisations unsettle the premise of every utopian plan from Patrick Geddes to 
Ebenezer Howard and occupy the pessimism of Mumford, who dwelt constantly on 
nuclear obliteration throughout his seminal volume The City in History. As is now 
well documented, these visions of apocalypse drew heavily upon the work of 
General ‘Hap’ Arnold, the chief of the US Army Air Forces during the Second World 
War, whose reports on the bomb to the Secretary of War supplied a devastating 
vision of the impacts of war from the air. In ‘The 36 Hour War’ – a graphic rendition 
of these reports published in Life magazine, the nuclear urban future can be seen in 
all its glory, imagery that has never lost its grip on post-apocalyptic literature and 
film.16[3] These narratives of urban destruction were widespread. In the days after 
the atom bomb fell on Hiroshima, the potential impacts such an attack would have 
on various American cities were visualized in numerous newspapers. This moment 
is crucial as the awe of atomic destruction in Japan was boomeranged back onto on 
	
US soil with the immediate conception of an atomic ground zero at the heart of the 
American city. [4] Visions of the end of the city proliferated throughout the 1950s. 
The Military Aspect, Panel II of the Special Studies Project, Rockefeller Brothers’ 
Foundation concluded that an attack on 50 cities would result in 10-15 million dead, 
15-20 million injured by blast and heat, 25-35 million fall-out casualties. When asked 
to comment about this scenario, Willard F. Libby of the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission, declared in 1958: ‘The large cities are gone’.17 Attempts to critique the 
position of what the social critic Marcus Raskin called ‘The Mega Death Intellectuals’, 
evoked the dead city.18 In an essay entitled ‘The Mushroom Cloud’, Virginia Snitow 
responded to the leak of part of the Deterrence & Survival in the Nuclear Age 
(Gaither) Report by laying out a vision of the end of the city: 19 
If New York City were bombed, one could write off the people buried 
under the rubble. No one could get into the burning ruins of the city for 
several days. The surrounding areas would be so occupied by their own 
efforts to keep alive that they could supply little if any assistance. 
Eventually, highly trained rescue teams might be able to come from 
distant areas … With a good part of our nation organized to assist, as in 
cases of storm and flood, something might be done for survivors fifteen or 
twenty miles from the blast center. However, New York would be, in 
case of war, only one of many target cities destroyed. The bombs and 
missiles would be falling all over the United States at about the same 
time, with each area an autonomy of chaos.20 
In 1961, the science fiction writer Rod Serling wrote a Twilight Zone episode called 
The Shelter. The television show depicted sirens ringing over a typical American 
suburb. The people of the community run to their only neighbour who has built a 
shelter, but he refuses entry. The result is torment and anarchy. Ultimately, it’s a false 
alarm. But when the calm is restored, while the neighbourhood is materially intact, 
the community’s social bonds are destroyed. This story – which resonates with 
debates then current – is important in that the bunker reveals not just the material 
threat to the city itself, but how the bomb challenged the foundational basis of 
urbanism in social and cultural relations. In this and other scenarios envisioning the 
end of the city it was not just the destruction of the built environment and the 
population they represented, but also implicated is the end of the underlying social 
contract between the citizens, the urban and State. Nuclear war was an existential 
threat to a whole way of life whose origins lay on the Enlightenment and eviscerated 
the place of the city in the narrative of human progress: the bomb dismantled the 
ancient relationship between urbs & civitas – as defined by St Augustine, the city as 
an embrace between its built form (urbs) and the cultures, practices and emotions 
that it contains (civitas).  
 
Urbs and ordnance 
The destruction of the associations between urbs and civitas are anticipated in the 
cultural histories of the bunker. Throughout the twentieth century and especially 
	
around the fulcrum of the Second World War, the bunker can be seen to oscillate, 
through literature, urbanism and architecture and between military, domestic and 
civic realms, between an imagination of space and a space of the imagination. Given 
perhaps its ultimate location in the passage between life and death, the 
representation of the bunker has offered intense reflection on the cultural and 
physical project of modernity. As a spatial type, bunkers were deeply imbued with 
these intentions. If a museum or a gallery was intended to offer an illuminated space 
for public reflection, the bunker was a place for private introspection with enormous 
public ramifications. Long before the Cold War, the final moment of Journey’s End, R. 
C. Sherriff’s play – written in 1928 in the aftermath of the First World War – depicts 
the collapse of a dug-out on the Western Front where a young soldier lies mortally 
wounded.21 The scene fulfils the promise of the play’s title, a terminus where the 
collapsing of a militarised space into darkness conflates with the eclipsing of a 
generation. Clearly written in the atomic age a generation later, Samuel Beckett’s 
play Endgame (1957) unfolds in what appears to be a similar, if updated, spatial type. 
Theodor Adorno, writing in an essay titled ‘Understanding Endgame,’ proposes that 
the stage directions of ‘Bare Interior’ ‘Grey light’ can be thought of as a concrete 
bunker or perhaps a new-fangled nuclear fallout shelter positioned between desert 
and sea, somewhere in the present or the near future.22 Of significance here is that 
the protagonists are apparently not combatants in a war but are joined by other ties 
and familial relationships. The setting, complete with dustbins, is as domestic as it is 
militaristic.  
             Particular examples from the culture of architectural production – both real 
and projected – provide symbolic evidence of such juxtapositions across a series of 
scales from the house to the city. For Jean-Louis Cohen, war served as an ‘accelerator 
of technological innovation and production that would lead to the supremacy of 
modernism in architecture.’ In this he has argued that the Second World War 
galvanized the connection between urbanists and the military – in particular by 
deploying many of the functional attributes of modernism into the operational 
platforms for warfare and later into the fabric of cities.23 This process inflected the 
whole urban condition of the Cold War whereby, as Pickering observes: ‘What had 
been largely separate and autonomous institutions before World War II ... had been 
profoundly transformed and locked together as a complex, social, material, and 
conceptual cyborg entity by the end of it’.24 
             Citing the Atomitat – Jay Swayze’s underground incursion into New York’s 
World’s Fair (1964) – and Philip Johnson’s Glass House at New Canaan, Connecticut 
(1949), Beatriz Colomina has explored the apparent dichotomy, within postwar 
modernist architecture, between a tendency to hunker down into the earth and a 
desire for light-weight transparency.25 Tom Vanderbilt has described Lever House – 
the glass skyscraper designed in New York in 1952 by Skidmore Owings and Merrill 
– as an example of ‘fatalistic architecture’ an architecture which, when faced with the 
bomb, both admitted and expressed its own impotence.26 Yet this arguably represents 
a departure in the purported functioning of glass architecture between before and 
	
after the Second World War, and even in its designed response to ordnance. As 
suggested by Cohen and Pickering, the Second World War – preceded by the threat 
of it – was pivotal in a re-conception of architecture and by extension, its relationship 
with both the ground plane and vertical and horizontal axes. It is a narrative borne 
out through a series of particular examples, each of which responds intimately to an 
ever increasing bomb yield. 
              Authors such as Paul Overy (2008) have described how an architecture of 
light, air and openness emerged between the wars.27 This was predicated on the use 
of the structural frame which precisely calibrated and resolved loads removing the 
need for large expanses of dense, load-bearing walls. The development of the curtain 
wall allowed the dissolution of the threshold, and the intimate connection of private 
and public space between the domestic or other interior and an increasingly planned 
and orchestrated landscape beyond. These new spatial relationships – developed in 
diverse building types such as housing, schools, hospitals, housing, factories, and so 
on – are perhaps best codified in Le Corbusier’s ‘Five Points of Architecture’ 
published in 1926: free façade, free plan, strip windows, pilotis, roof garden. 
Together, these elements realise a lightweight architecture of exposure which aspires 
to be constructed in dry, prefabricated factory-made parts. The roof garden allows 
an unencumbered relationship with the sky and the elements, the pilotis permit the 
building not only to be sited almost anywhere but also to hover above the ground, 
touching it only where absolutely necessary. 
               In 1914, on the eve of the First World War, in a book called Glasarchitektur 
the author and poet Paul Scheerbart expressed an extreme version of the utopian 
optimism surrounding the possibilities of transparent, framed constructions. For 
Scheerbart such an architecture, if realised universally, would convey a new form of 
social democracy and the end of crime through the simple fact that its very 
transparency would facilitate omnipotent passive surveillance. Equally intriguing, 
however, is his description of this architecture in the context of the development of 
new forms of vertical aerial warfare. 
A glass tower when it is supported by more than four metal piers, will not be destroyed 
by an aerial torpedo; a few iron members will be bent, and a number of glass panels will 
have holes or cracks, but such damage is simple to repair’.28 
The conception of a tall, framed building that is somehow resistant to vertical 
ordnance was taken up again in 1930 by Le Corbusier in his famous urban proposals 
for La Ville Radieuse. Drawing from his earlier proposal of ‘crystal towers soaring 
higher than any pinnacle of earth’ of the Plan Voisin, Le Corbusier imagined a series 
of towers strewn across a bucolic landscape. Precisely serviced with water, gas and 
electricity, they are simultaneously fortified against La Guerre Aérienne by the narrow 
roof-scape they present to the bomber and against poison gas by virtue of their 
height.29 
               But such naïve optimism towards the defensive qualities of modernist high-
rise glass architecture disintegrated in the Second World War and its prelude. 
Emblematic of this is the publication produced by the modernist Tecton Architects in 
	
the late 1930s. Entitled Planned A.R.P. (Air Raid Protection), commissioned by the 
Metropolitan Borough of Finsbury, and deploying the talents of Ove Arup under the 
aegis of Berthold Lubetkin, the book systematically explores the effects of an air war 
on an urban built environment.30 It analyses methods of attacks, measures and 
categorises yield and types of bomb – incendiary, gas, percussion, general purpose, 
semi-armour piercing – their dispersal and likely effects – impact, shock, 
penetration, blast, splinters, falling debris, etc. – on architecture and civic space. 
Against these, measures of protection, from slit trenches to the use of existing 
basements, surface shelters to deep excavations, are also surveyed and their 
attributes and qualities explained. The effects of bombing are given a narrative 
dimension by accompanying drawings by Gordon Cullen. Curiously amusing, these 
drawings depict devastation in the streets, collapsing basements, exploding 
buildings, and panicking populations. The solution offered by Tecton were huge, 
circular shelters, bored into the earth and linking surface to beneath with a helical 
circulation system that would accommodate the flow of hundreds of civilians in war 
while in peace-time allow for their use as a car park. After taking in consideration 
other criteria such as physical contours, population density, the condition of 
buildings and the disposition of invisibles infrastructures such as water, gas and 
sewage, Tecton redrew the map of Finsbury to accommodate a network of deep 
shelters distributed more or less evenly across the borough. Designed as a prototype 
for a wider national system, the government dismissed the proposal as being 
potentially detrimental to morale – and promoting a shelter, possibly Communist, 
mentality. 
              The architecture of Tecton in the 1930s provides a precise paradigm of the 
effect and threat of war on the production of architectural form: a unity of opposites 
and reversals, underground and over-ground – progress and ultimately despair. At 
the same time as Planned ARP was being scripted in 1938, they were completing 
Highpoint II, their second, slender, white tower block hoisted above the ground on 
pilotis in north London. Their penguin pool at London zoo, meanwhile, prefigures 
the circulation spaces of Finsbury’s deep shelter. In the former, penguins cavort on a 
double helical ramp suspended in the air fabricated in as thin-as-possible reinforced 
concrete. In the latter, the ramp system controls and articulates the flow of civilians 
as they seek shelter from advanced forms of ordnance by efficiently slipping 
underground. [5, 6] 
                During the Second World War, modernist architectural luminaries such as 
Le Corbusier, Jose Luis Sert and Sigfried Giedion considered the future of the city in 
light of its destruction in Europe. While Nine Points on Monumentality (1943) 
recognized the need for enduring symbolism in architecture perhaps to account for a 
pervading loss, Sert’s Can our Cities Survive? (1942) and Le Corbusier’s Le Charte 
d’Athènes (1943) propose the continuity of a mechanistic approach, a horizontal 
separation of functions and the rigorous application of economic and social planning. 
31 For Bosman, the proposal integrated everything: 
	
… contained in the Taylorist/Fordist conception of the beautiful new world: a 
comprehensively coordinated growth model conducive to the attainment of a balance 
between the city and the country, the control of urban functions ... in short, the 
transformation of a previously empirically developed urban conglomeration into an 
organised, flawlessly hygienic and structurally transparent urban machine.32 
Promoted by C.I.A.M. (Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne), Le Charte 
d’Athènes provided the blueprint for post-war reconstruction across Europe. But 
significantly these texts were written before the destruction of Hiroshima. 
               While Scheerbart and Le Corbusier’s proposals display perhaps a willful 
ignorance, Tecton’s underground proposals are predicated upon a scientific 
understanding of the increasing yield of conventional weapons. In Survival Cities, 
Vanderbilt observes that defensive architecture is perpetually caught within a race 
with developing forms of ordnance.33 For Peter Galison, this quality of form 
following destructive yield at the scale of architecture and the city has a final 
iteration in the dispersal strategies proposed for 1950s America.34 Two further 
examples from either side of the Second World War provide more evidence of a 
profound shift yet continuity in thinking. Ludwig Hilbersheimer’s Grosstadt (1927) 
epitomizes the Fordist city of total planning and prefigures the C.I.A.M. city as a 
fully mechanized urban entity predicated on a precise response to perceived 
functional criteria. [7] In The Nature of Cities (1955), he admits the nuclear bomb into 
this pantheon of bureaucratic and scientific requirements to propose the 
decentralized city, redolent of Frank Lloyd Wright’s Broadacre City (1935), a holistic 
and integrated landscape of highways, industry and domiciles whose dispersal 
would ultimately allow survival.35 [8] 
              Galison points out dispersal strategies – drawing heavily upon information 
garnered from the bombing of Germany and models generated from analysis of 
Hiroshima – were advocated early in the US. The ‘Redesign of our country for 
minimum vulnerability to atomic bomb attack, which means complete dispersal of 
our cities and moving vital industries under-ground’, is the third atomic bomb 
defence suggested by General Arnold. Early in 1950, the physicist Norbert Wiener 
drew upon cybernetic methodologies to propose dispersing settlement across the 
landscape. Citing the low-density occupation of the Soviet Union as being less likely 
to succumb to utter Atomic devastation, Wiener’s proposal becomes another 
paradigm for a series of models of networked suburbanisation and infrastructural 
development. For Wiener, however, civil defence provision also contained the 
possibility of a redistribution of wealth, part of ‘a positive program of social and 
economic action directed at the elimination of poverty and social injustice which are 
the source of Communist power’.36 
               While propositions for dispersal were influential and did effect some 
substantial interventions in the American landscape – most notably the interstate 
highway system under the presidency of Eisenhower – such strategies were 
ultimately undone by both economics and ideology. The yield of hydrogen bombs 
was such that resistance, if ever possible, would have required a holistic, integrated, 
	
planned, totalising urban system. Mass, designed survival at the scale of the city 
contained one last evident paradox – and this was evident not only within dispersal 
strategies but also elsewhere in other grand schemes like Oscar Newman’s proposal 
for a subterranean, nuclear-proof Manhattan (1969) – that survival would require 
levels of State control, organisation and intervention normally associated with the 
Communist bloc. The cost of survival would be the price of freedom. [9] 
 
Becoming atomic: fragmentation and myth  
The process of cities becoming atomic was diverse, often contested and changed over 
time. It was, moreover, fragmentary and as reliant on the production of information, 
myth and representations of space as it was on the production of space itself. In 1962, 
$38 million was released by Congress to survey the built environment of the USA 
and evaluate its potential to both survive and offer shelter. The American Institute of 
Architects collaborated with the Office of Civil Defense using both architects and 
architectural students to complete this task. There are of interest because they seem 
to promote survival at the level of the individual building. Architecture and a 
modernist pallet continue to be called upon to defend and protect but in precise, 
isolated interventions into the built environment rather than holistic definitions of 
new urban complexes. Projects exhibited at the Rice University Conference on 
Industrial Buildings (1963) proposed a strategy of sinking buildings half-way into the 
ground. Thus, the basement lunchroom could double as a fallout shelter while 
upstairs the rest of the building would address the building environment in a more 
conventional manner. Similarly, the Grand Prize of the National School Fallout 
Shelter Design Competition (1963) was awarded to Ellery C. Green, an architect 
working in Tucson Arizona. He was praised by the jury for providing a shelter in a 
school which presented no interference or conflict with the normal functioning of the 
building, noting that in fact ‘it is not readily apparent that [it] was designed as a 
shelter … The light airy feel achieved in this essentially below ground facility is a 
significant advantage in shelter habitability’.37 Here, the subterranean is deployed in 
a range of spaces designed to allow continuities of life following nuclear fallout and 
to reconcile modernist prerequisites for light and air with a terrain of blast proof 
doors and thickened reinforced concrete reminiscent of the Maginot Line beneath. 
[10, 11] 
              In her essay, ‘Architects of Armageddon’, Melissa Smith explores the gaps in 
information between banal advice on continuing everyday life during nuclear war 
contained in a British governmental pamphlet from 1959 – including the best way of 
using washing machines and vacuum cleaners to dispose of radioactive material – 
and a highly secret report written two years earlier for the same government 
envisioning utter devastation under the same conditions.38 For Mark Duffield: 
 official thinking began to focus on the continuity of government and vital systems 
while leaving the public’s survival, apart from palliative rehearsal and educational 
measures, to luck and self reliance. In the UK, this shift was marked in 1972 by a name 
change from Civil to Home Defence. 39 
	
Sarah A. Lichtman has explored the phenomenon of at-home bunker making in the 
1950s and 1960s USA suggesting that not only was this somehow more consistent 
with the American ‘traits of enterprise and independence’ but also that these 
initiatives (echoing Masco above) ultimately ‘permeated America’s post-war 
consciousness more than its physical landscape’.40 The volume of advice manuals 
published internationally concerning nuclear survival at home is impressive, as are 
the titles that evocatively express juxtapositions between domestic or otherwise 
ordinary space, and catastrophe. The following list is by no means comprehensive: 
Shelter from Atomic Attack in Existing Building: Part I Methods for Determining Shelter 
Needs and Shelter Areas (Federal Civil Defence Administration, 1952); The Family 
Fallout Shelter (Executive Office of the President 1959); Clay Masonry Family Fallout 
Shelter (Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, 1960); Fallout Protection: What to 
know and Do about Nuclear Attack (Department of Defence, Office of Civil Defence, 
1961); The Behaviour of Radioactive Fallout in Soils and Plants (National Academy of 
Sciences – National Research Council, 1963); Advising the Householder on Protection 
Against Nuclear Attack (HMSO, 1963); Fallout Protection for Homes with Basements 
(Department of Defence, Office of Civil Defence, 1966); Expedience Shelter Construction 
and Occupancy Experiments (Cresson H. Kearney, Oak Ridge Laboratory, TE, 1976); 
Home Fallout Shelter Snack Bar plan d – basement location Fallout Shelter (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 1980) (Fig 8); Domestic Nuclear Shelter: 
Advice on Domestic Shelter providing protection against nuclear explosion (UK, 1980s). 
Jeder hat eine Chance [Everyone has a Chance] (1961) (cited above) provides an 
example from outside the UK/US axis. Despite spanning decades, faced with a 
universal threat of nuclear blast and fallout these publications offer a consistent 
series of prescriptions, specifications for new building or retro-fitting and lists of 
equipment and advice on what to store and how to behave. Many contain 
architectural drawings, others combine these with cartoon scenarios of survival 
either drawn or in photograph. Some provide diagrams of the yield and effect of 
nuclear explosion. Jeder hat eine Chance depicts individuals caught out in the open by 
the blast and suggests possible actions: occupying a ditch, lying on the ground near 
some steps with a bag over your head, sitting underneath a table in an echo of the 
US’s infamous ‘duck and cover’ drills.41 [12] Others evoke domestic continuities, 
women cooking, people serving drinks, families at rest and at play, or else making 
the shelter in the first place, generally by digging. In the domestication of nuclear 
survival portrayed by these publications there is, however, no community. Instead, 
there is just piece by piece fragments of individualised, isolated survival. As hinted 
by Jay Swayze’s proposal, in the domestic shelter and the descent into the ground 
there is no longer any urban.  
 
Bunker Resistances 
In 1959, the New York planner Walter Thabit stood out by arguing to his colleagues 
that ‘The fallout shelter program serves only to lull the nation into a false sense of 
security. The planning profession, therefore, should disassociate itself from this 
	
program and should advocate a productive political solution as the only protective 
measure that will save our cities’.42 These are issues well covered in Cold War social 
history, notably, Dee Garrison’s Bracing for Armageddon (2006), which reveals the 
popular opposition toward civil defense drills and public rehearsals, and Laura 
McEnaney’s Civil Defense Begins at Home (2000) which unravels the discomfort many 
felt dealing with the ramifications of militarization of family life under civil defense 
regulations.43 This scholarship underlines how state investment in the bunker as the 
site in which both city and population would survive, inevitably made it a site of 
disquiet both in the USA and internationally. Imposing the bunker into the urban 
sphere was destabilising. It linked daily life unwillingly to Cold War conflict, 
embedding the battlefield into the domestic in a way that could be relentless and 
disturbing in its effects.44 It generated a complex fear, based on blast, insecure 
sequestration underground, uncertain future, possible post-war anarchy and cruel 
disease from nuclear fallout. In this process, the State became riddled with 
contradictions, being at once the provider of security and part of the reason through 
which security itself would be destroyed. In 1948, the Emergency Committee of 
Atomic Scientists, of which Albert Einstein was president, presented six statements 
about the reality of nuclear war to the public. No. 5 concerns bunkers: ‘Preparedness 
against atomic war is futile, and if attempted will ruin the structure of our social 
order’.45 This observation was prescient. In her work on civil defence training in the 
American school system, the historian Jo Anne Brown has captured the stresses such 
kinds of preparation involved. Faced with the prospect of nuclear attack, the 
National Parent-Teachers Association (PTA) instructed teachers to set their own 
‘emotional houses in order’ and then help children to do so’. She notes that for the 
PTA ‘… the future mental health of an entire generation depended upon parents’ and 
teachers’ abilities to ‘maintain calmness and transmit a feeling of assuredness’. 
Children must be taught to ‘meet squarely’ the ‘emergencies they might face, 
including atomic bombardment’.46 These emotional strains upon civic and personal 
life were not uncommon. Writing in the Scientific American, the peace activist Arthur 
Waskow reported how ‘the civil defence effort has strained the web of community’ 
as surveys concluded that individuals – like the Twilight Zone episode – were 
prepared to exclude ‘neighbours, or people from the next block, or strangers from the 
next county, or casual visitors to town, from the family or community shelter’. These 
strains they concluded would only be exacerbated as ‘… cities realise how vulnerable 
they are to attack, as racial and ethnic groups compete for space in and access to 
community shelters’.47 
No amount of propaganda could evade the realization that atomic war would lead to 
what Derrida saw as ‘… a total and remainderless destruction of the archive’.48 The 
archive in this case was the social relations that held a city together. Citizens were 
obliged to resolve – if they could – dissonant feelings as they lived in what Masco 
describes as ‘… a new psycho-social space between the utopian promise of American 
techno-science and the minute-to-minute threat of thermonuclear incineration’.49 It 
meant that many experienced the contradictions of what Bacon Hales describes as 
	
the ‘… paradigmatic Cold War cultural landscape, simultaneously a huddling place 
and open community, with neither extreme particularly far from the other’.50As the 
geographer Robert E. Dickinson put it, in his review of Mumford’s The City in History 
‘… in our contemporary megalopolitan civilization, necropolis is near’.51 
               Protest, cynicism and satirical responses were commonplace. In the UK, the 
pamphlet Advising the Householder on Protection against Nuclear Attack published in 
1963 was widely mocked while, in New York around the same time, Sally Baldwin, 
writing in the satirical magazine The Realist observed how: 
Creating an adequate fallout shelter program is all well and good, and it will be a 
comfort to many to know that their families are being protected. Anybody can see 
however, that this plan has a major fallacy: when the Button is pushed, you are apt to 
be in Canarsie on business, while your cosy shelter sits out in Mastic Acres, Long 
Island. 
Hence she proposed a ‘Bomb Shelter Key Club Plan’, where like minded individuals 
– such as jazz enthusiasts and bridge players – could club together to make like-
minded shelters, to avoid the distressing prospect of spending the last weeks of your 
life with ‘mothers with squealing brats; matronly school teachers in town sightseeing 
from God’s Shank; and the little man who normally sold shoddy hats with long 
plumes and the name ‘Spunky’ stitched thereon in Times Square’.52 But perhaps the 
most acute critique came from the Situationist International. Observing the 
construction in French cities of rent controlled housing (Habitation à Loyer Modéré), 
and the provision of bunkers beneath them, they argued: 
[the] concentration-camp organization of the surface of the earth is the normal state of 
the present society in formation; its condensed subterranean version merely represents 
that society’s pathological excess. This subterranean sickness reveals the real nature of 
the ‘health’ at the surface. 
For them, the logos of infinite preparation and the real purpose of the shelter ‘is to 
test – and thereby reinforce – people’s submissiveness and to manipulate this 
submissiveness to the advantage of the ruling society’.53 
 
Conclusion 
Duffield’s identification of 1972 as the pivotal moment between the suggestion of 
governmental provision of mass, civil shelter to a limited strategic response and the 
onus on the population to provide their own, is an interesting one. Marking the end 
of the post-war economic boom and the Bretton-Woods agreement which tied the US 
and other currencies to the gold standard, 1972 is often cited as the end of an 
economic and social epoch. In architecture, the destruction of the Le Corbusier-
inspired narrow, tall, vertical blocks at Pruitt-Igoe in the same year was famously 
hailed by Charles Jencks as the ‘end of modernism’.54 In his essay ‘War Against the 
Centre’, Peter Galison proposes that a post-modernistic conception and re-ordering 
of space can be identified as emerging from the distributed strategies deployed by 
the Nazi administration in the final years of the Second World War. Its 
redeployment in the US, in proposals and partially executed projects for dispersal 
	
from the 1950s onwards, ‘The modernist trope of concentration became 
postmodernist dispersal, cohesion shifted to fragmentation, and metropolis to 
counter-urbanisation’ – ultimately leading to intense urban sprawl.55 
               It is tempting to also see the postmodern in Jay Swayze and others’ 
proposals for underground living. Here, in a parodic iteration of the aspirations of 
the modernist villa, and using the ground as a fulcrum, thresholds between inside 
and outside are thickened rather than diminished and connections to landscape and 
views replaced by dial-up panoramas, free-floating signifiers for an imagined, 
nostalgic and unconnected reality. But as David Harvey and others point out, in the 
transition between modernism and post-modernism there are acts of continuity as 
well as cessation.56 In Weimar Germany, the architect Bruno Taut and others 
established the idea of a wohnkultur a new way of living which, through the 
intercession of architectural space embodying technology and extending to urban 
organisation, would realise a new type of character and psychology in the 
individual, leading to the production of a new type of progressive society. Despite 
the contestations and criticisms of the bunker that emerge throughout its Cold War 
recirculation from the military to the domestic, for Lichtman, Masco and others the 
bunker has provided an equally pervasive and operative cultural legacy not in the 
interest of communal progress but of individual survival and an on-going 
perpetuation of terror. The bunker, with its tight functionalist alignment of form 
following ordnance, has not necessarily compelled people to underground lives but 
rather the idea of it has been instrumental in inculcating an underground mentality. 
[13] From this perspective, the bunker is simultaneously both the apotheosis and 
antithesis of modernity. It speaks of a terminal architecture where human social and 
personal is directly affected by spatial circumstances but where an architecture of 
putative progress is overtaken by an architecture of stasis. 
            For there is no progress after annihilation, and no capacity, revolutionary or 
otherwise, for the fall-out shelter to build a better world, as envisioned for other 
architectural interventions within modernist culture and politics. The shelter was to 
all extents a cave or a tomb. If, for Paul Virilio, the Atlantic War represented a 
monument to the advent of total war then Jay Swayze’s Underground Gardens and 
Homes project can be seen as totemic of its perpetuation. In this regard, the bunker 
suggests continuation without development, the end of modernism, history, and the 
Enlightenment project. Paradoxically, one of the functions the bunker served is to 
make these relationships explicit and accordingly, it becomes a lightning-rod for 
critique and counter-culture. The bunker’s position within a dialectic of modernity 
that moves forward and back across time allows the apparent distance between it 
and other forms of architecture to be recast as relationships of proximity. This is a 
discordant space, a conditionality that inflected its meaning during the Cold War 
and continues in the bunker’s afterlife, shaping its interpretation as ruin, 
archaeology, and art. It is this spatial dissonance, internal contradiction and cultural 
instability which holds so much fascination. The space cannot be contained 
underground but rather, in both in its genealogy as an urban artefact and its form 
	
and intent as a means to manage insecurity – though any number of exclusionary 
urban practices reflected in green-zones, securitization and gated urban 
communities – its influences are widely manifested.  
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